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To realign supervisory and market incentives, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991 (FDICIA) adjusts two principal features of federal banking supervision. First, it requires
regulators to examine insured institutions more frequently and makes them accountable for exercising
their supervisory powers.  Second, the Act empowers regulators to wind up the affairs of troubled
institutions before their accounting net worth is exhausted. 
Using 1984–2003 data on the outcome of individual bank examinations, this paper documents that
the frequency of rating transitions and the character of insolvency resolutions have changed substantially
under FDICIA. The average interval between bank examinations has dropped for low-rated banks
in the post-FDICIA era. Examiner upgrades have become significantly more likely in the post-FDICIA
era even after controlling for the state of the economy. However, in recessions managers are slower
to correct problems that examiners identify.  As a result, during downturns upgrades become less likely
and absorptions become more likely. 
Giving the FDIC authority to wind up troubled banks before their tangible net worth is exhausted has
reduced the role of government in the insolvency-resolution process. Consistent with an hypothesis
that FDICIA has improved incentives, our data show that a markedly larger percentage of troubled
banks now search for a merger partner rather than trying to stay in business until the regulators force
them to fail.  This greater reliance on quasi-voluntary mergers is observable both within and across
various stages of the business cycle.  These findings suggest that supervisory interventions became


















In hopes of simultaneously improving supervisory and market incentives, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) expanded the authority and 
responsibilities of federal banking agencies in two ways.  First, the Act requires regulators to 
exercise their monitoring and enforcement powers in a particular fashion.  Second, the Act 
empowers regulators to wind up the affairs of troubled institutions before their accounting net 
worth is exhausted. 
FDICIA formally requires regulators to conduct an on-site examination of every insured 
bank or thrift within specified intervals. It also requires them to initiate an escalating series of 
corrective actions and formal calls for the replenishment of capital when, and as, the capital 
position of an institution deteriorates.  Finally, FDICIA makes the FDIC accountable for 
resolving failing institutions at minimum cost to the insurance fund.  These obligations are 
enforced by requiring the Office of the Inspector General at the relevant agencies to file audit 
reports in cases that generate material losses to the deposit insurance fund.  These reports review 
the timeliness and cost effectiveness of corrective actions taken (e.g., Office of Inspector 
General, 2003).  
Two hypotheses underlie these changes.  The first holds that accounting capital and 
examination ratings are at best lagging indicators of a bank’s health, particularly when the 
economic environment in which it operates undergoes a major improvement or decline between 
reports.  The second maintains that, prior to the enactment of FDICIA, incentives facing troubled 
depository institutions, and the agencies responsible for supervising them, perversely extended 
the lives of ruined firms (see, e.g., FDIC, 1997 or Kane, 1989).  According to the second 
hypothesis, shortages of budgetary resources, which were in part politically driven, left 
authorities unable to examine banks frequently or carefully enough.  Information gaps and delays   3
intensified incentive conflicts.  In turn, these incentive conflicts tempted supervisors to postpone 
the imposition of exit pressure.  The result was that federal guarantees kept funds flowing to 
economically insolvent institutions long after private creditors would otherwise have forced them 
out of business.  
This paper uses data from 1984 to 2005 on examination outcomes to test hypotheses 
about whether and how FDICIA influenced the timing and focus of the monitoring process and 
also the channels through which developing shortages of bank capital are treated and cured. 
We want to stress that the influence of FDICIA and examination ratings on the path of 
bank and supervisory risk taking after 1991 was bound to be affected by other developments.  In 
particular, large banks increasingly used securitizations and off-balance-sheet investment 
vehicles to mask their true leverage from bank examiners, while relaxed restrictions on interstate 
banking and branching increased the number of potential buyers for troubled banks. Changes in 
macroeconomic conditions should also affect the willingness and ability of bank managers to 
correct problems that examiners identify. In recessions, higher-rated institutions know that 
supervisors have to focus their resources on their most troubled clients and lack the time to exert 
much discipline on minor concerns.   
Our paper seeks to test what we call the better-incentives hypothesis: the claim that, at 
least in the immediate wake of FDICIA, supervisory and failure resolution processes improved 
incentives for regulators and for bank shareholders, especially at banks that received low 
examination ratings. 
Examinations can not register deteriorations or improvements in a bank’s condition until 
some months after they occur.  FDICIA encourages examiners to refocus their monitoring effort 
on positions, internal control systems, and strategies that expose the FDIC to loss.  Our evidence   4
shows a reduction in the average interval between completed examinations for low-rated banks. 
Substantial changes occur as well in the frequency and characteristics of rating transitions for all 
ratings classes.   
Our findings also suggest that, at least for the risks that examiners could see, supervisory 
interventions became more effective at troubled banks.  Rather than problem institutions 
transitioning into lower rating classes in successive exams and eventual failing, problem banks 
proved significantly more likely to recover.  Furthermore, examiners prove significantly more 
likely to upgrade banks in successive examinations.  The increased frequency of upgrades 
supports the hypothesis that problem banks faced stronger incentives to correct the particular 
deficiencies that examiners identify.  
Still, common sense suggests that resolving supervisory concerns would require more 
effort as a bank’s rating declines and also as the economic environment weakens. In line with 
this, post-FDICIA differences in ratings transitions prove more strongly significant both in 
business-cycle expansions than in recessions and for higher-rated institutions than for lower-
rated ones.  
Regulatory discipline includes: memoranda of understanding; cease-and-desist orders; 
removal, prohibition, or suspension of individuals; and notices of intent to terminate insurance 
(see Curry, O’Keefe, Coburn, and Montgomery, 1999; Office of Inspector General, 2003).  
Giving the FDIC responsibility and authority to wind up troubled banks before their tangible net 
worth disappears reduced the role that supervisory failures play in the insolvency-resolution 
process.  Now, only banks in extreme distress find destabilizing “gambles for resurrection” an 
attractive strategy.  As long as a troubled bank has substantial intangible franchise value to 
preserve, the prospect of prompt and strong regulatory discipline gives managers an incentive to   5
rebuild their capital or to shop their enterprise to potential acquirers in and out of their 
headquarters state. 
This paper develops statistical evidence that, aside from instances of sudden and severe 
distress, FDICIA enhanced regulatory and failing-bank incentives.  The data show a marked 
increase both in examination frequency and in the percentages of problem banks that remedy 
their weaknesses or submit to a private takeover rather than waiting for regulators to pull their 
charter.  
 
1. Monitoring: Examiner Risk Assessments 
 
Managers of national safety nets are in the risk-acceptance and risk-management 
business.  Conducting this business entails repeatedly monitoring client risk exposure, measuring 
and pricing it in a realistic manner, and taking timely steps to rein in excessive or inappropriate 
client risk-taking whenever it is observed (Kane, 1995 and Llewellyn and Mayes, 2003).   
Using data from examinations conducted by Federal Reserve personnel, Hirtle and Lopez 
(1999, p. 2) estimate that data gathered in an on-site examination cease “to provide useful 
information about the current condition of a bank” somewhere between 18 months and three 
years after an examination.  Between 1979 and 1986, the mean interval between successive on-
site examinations at U.S. commercial banks surged from roughly a year to 609 days (FDIC, 
1997, p. 429).  Although the mean interval fell back thereafter, it did not fall to one year again 
until 1993.  Of course, at many banks the interval between examinations would have been larger 
than the mean.  
FDICIA now requires that “the appropriate Federal banking agency shall, not less than 
once during each 12-month period, conduct a full-scope, on-site examination of each insured 
depository institution.”  However, FDICIA allows state examinations to be substituted for federal   6
ones in alternating 12-month periods and expands the permissible interval to 18 months for most 
well-capitalized and well-managed institutions with less than $100 million in total assets.  
Subsequently, for banks that receive high examination ratings on their last exam, the Community 
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 increased the size threshold to $250 
million.  In December 2006, the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act increased the threshold 
again, this time to $500 million. 
Upon the completion of an exam, examiners assign each bank a composite grade between 
1 and 5.  The grade is based on a series of characteristics that together loosely estimate the risk 
that the bank poses to the deposit insurance fund.  Banks rated 1 are held to be sound in every 
respect. Banks rated 2 are deemed fundamentally sound, while those rated 3 raise some degree of 
supervisory concern.  Banks rated 4 and 5 exhibit unsafe and unsound practices or conditions. 
On-site examination provides regulators with better information than they can obtain 
from merely monitoring financial institutions remotely.  However, examiners’ time is limited and 
they must employ tools of forensic accounting. The result is that examiners can only 
approximately rank the fragility and resiliency of individual banks.  Still, other things equal, the 
higher the composite score, the worse the condition of the bank.   
Traditionally, five characteristics were scored: capital, asset quality, management, 
earnings, and liquidity.  These five component ratings were compiled into a single number called 
the composite “CAMEL” rating.  However, opportunities for banks of all sizes to assume 
increasingly complex positions have expanded over time.  This additional complexity was 
formally acknowledged in 1997, by adding a sixth component to the rating system—sensitivity 
to market risk (S).  Furthermore, this revision to the bank rating system required bank   7
supervisors to place more emphasis on evaluating risk management processes and practices at 
banks. 
To strengthen the link between a bank’s rating history and the degree of supervisory 
pressure that it should experience, the prompt corrective-action (PCA) provisions of FDICIA 
rely on observable capital ratios.  Over time, the deeper and more rapidly a bank’s rating moves 
into adverse territory (ratings classes 3, 4, and 5), the more frequently and intensively that bank 
is apt to be re-examined and the more firmly it will be asked to address identified deficiencies  
(e.g., in asset quality or loss reserving) or to replenish its capital position.  Presumably, the 
longer a bank languishes in a problem state, the higher the probability that banking authorities 
will decide to wrest control of its affairs from managers and shareholders.  
Table 1 explores the proportion of insured institutions in each composite rating class that 
failed to experience a re-examination within each of three time intervals following a particular 
exam—12 months, 18 months and 24 months.
1  Appendix A details the types of examinations 
included in our sample.  
Table 1 divides the data into the two size categories by which 1994 legislation defined 
the maximum time span that should pass between exams.  For each size category, the table 
compares exam frequency before and after the enactment of FDICIA.
2  
Within both size classes, the decline in the proportion of institutions that are not re-
examined in the post-FDICIA period is striking and grows with the length of the interval.  
Differences in these distributions are statistically significant at conventional levels, except for the 
                                                 
1 Because examination end dates are difficult to determine historically, we use start dates to determine the timing of 
the examinations.  On the grounds that they merely extend the initial visit, examinations that occur within 30 days of 
the previous examination are not counted. 
2 We assume that examination timetables are fully compliant with FDICIA.  The FDIC Examination Manual (FDIC, 
2004) defines examination frequencies as the “the length of time between the end of one exam to the start of the 
next.” Data limitations force us to measure examination frequency as the length of time between beginning dates of 
examinations.  This will tend to overstate the interval between exams.    8
poorest-rated category of small banks at the 24-month interval.
3  The largest declines in the 
proportion of institutions that are not-reexamined occur for well-rated institutions.  An institution 
can expand its loss exposures and dissipate its capital relatively more quickly today than in the 
past.  Sponsors of FDICIA hoped that increasing examiner scrutiny would reinforce the 
discipline that private counterparties exert in derivatives, large-deposit, and subordinated-debt 
markets on troubled banks. 
 
2. Post-FDICIA Changes in Solvency-Enforcement Strategy  
Before running formal statistical tests comparing the pre- and post-FDICIA periods, it is 
important to explain how FDICIA changed the focus of the solvency-enforcement process.  
FDICIA seeks to overcome political and bureaucratic pressures that might unwisely delay the 
resolution of an economically insolvent institution.  Procedures for implementing the Act focus 
on leverage ratios (ratios of bank capital to total assets) that are either calculated from data 
contained in bank Call Reports or established in transmittal reports prepared at the end of an 
examination.  Typically, examiners identify a bank as a problem months before its accounting 
capital begins to deteriorate (Office of Inspector General, 2003). 
Clever accounting can temporarily keep losses from registering on Call Reports. It often 
takes examiners more than a single examination cycle to uncover the full extent of ongoing 
patterns of loss concealment.  By successfully under-reporting imbedded losses or under-
reserving for its loss exposures, an economically insolvent institution can avoid breaching PCA 
                                                 
3 Throughout the paper we use four different tests to test for differences in the distributions:  a t-test, an F-test, a 
Chi-squared test and a Kolgomorov-Smirnov (K-S) test.  The null hypothesis for the t-test is that the probability in 
the subsample is equal to the probability in the whole sample.  This test assumes that the probabilities are derived 
from a standard binomial distribution.  We use an F-test to examine the null hypothesis that the variance in the 
subsample is the same as the variance for the whole sample.  The null hypothesis for the Chi-squared test is that the 
row in each conditional, or subsample, probability matrix is drawn from the same population.  Similarly, the null 
hypothesis for the K-S test is that two rows of the observed transition probabilities are drawn from the same 
population distribution.  Results are available from the authors by request.   9
thresholds or lessen the consequences of a particular breach by understating the needed injection 
of new capital (Office of the Inspector General, 2003).  Because troubled banks so frequently 
under-reserve for loan losses, Berger, King, and O’Brien (1991) and Shibut, Critchfield, and 
Bohn (2003) suggest introducing a regression-based adjustment to each bank’s reported loss 
reserves into PCA triggers.  Such an adjustment could easily be extrapolated from Call Report 
data on delinquent and nonperforming loans.  By drawing on recent and future advances in 
modeling credit risk, this approach could generate improved measures of the true quarterly net 
capital positions of problem banks. 
Under the current system, institutions are classified as “undercapitalized” when their 
reported or examiner-adjusted capital (calculated as a percentage of bank assets) dips below any 
one of the thresholds shown in the third line of Table 2.  Institutions that become “significantly 
undercapitalized” can be ordered to recapitalize promptly.  However, to provide an opportunity 
for consultation, formal orders are preceded by a letter stating the regulatory agency’s intent to 
issue a “PCA Directive”.  The PCA Directive imposes specified proscriptions on the bank and 
requires its managers to file a satisfactory plan for restoring its capital to benchmarked levels 
within 60 days of the effective date of the Directive.  In most cases, the institution has two weeks 
either to accept the Directive or to schedule an administrative hearing.  When issued, the 
Directive notifies the bank that, if after 120 days it has not managed to increase the designated 
leverage ratios as required, it must immediately take “the necessary action” to find an acquirer or 
merger partner.  Institutions whose tangible equity falls below two percent are deemed “critically 
undercapitalized.”  PCA Directives sent to these firms have a shorter fuse and impose more 
proscriptions.    10
FDICIA allows even strongly rated banks to be closed or taken over.  Whenever serious 
accounting irregularities are discovered that, once corrected, cause the capital of the institution to 
drop below the “critically undercapitalized” threshold, the offending institution can be closed 
immediately.  Accounting fraud and depositor runs can short-circuit PCA triggers.  Losses to the 
deposit insurance fund in sudden failures (which dominate post-FDICIA failures) are very high.  
Ordinarily, the failure process begins with the issuance of a “Failing Bank Letter” by the 
bank’s chartering authority to the FDIC.  To encourage competing bids, the FDIC markets the 
failing bank or thrift widely to potential acquirers. Although individual customers and 
speculators might sense the institution’s growing weakness, its failing status is not revealed to 
the general public.  FDIC personnel assemble an information package for potential bidders 
(FDIC, 1998, p. 6).  Part of the information package is an asset-valuation review.  Alternate 
resolution structures are studied and an on-site analysis is undertaken to prepare for the possible 
closing.  A formal information meeting is held to discuss the details of the failing institution with 
the set of approved bidders.
4  According to the FDIC, if the process results in a supervisory 
closure, it is “generally carried out in 90 to 100 days, not including the post-closing settlement 
timeframes” (FDIC, 1998, p. 76).  
 
3. Markov Transition Matrices: Preliminary Evidence 
This study seeks to infer how post-FDICIA examination and resolution protocols altered 
incentives for regulators and shareholders of banks in different CAMELS ratings classes.  To do 
                                                 
4 Potential acquirers submit bids in two parts: the first amount is the premium for the franchise value of the failed 
institution’s deposits, and the second amount covers either all or whatever part of the institution’s assets the bidder 
prefers.  Bids are forwarded to FDIC headquarters, where they are compared and a least-cost determination is made.   11
this, it studies rating transitions observed during 1984 to 2005 in completed exams across 12-
month, 18-month, and 24-month horizons.
5  
Our analysis investigates how transition frequencies vary when the data are partitioned in 
interesting ways.  To compare any pair of matrices, we focus on their main diagonals and two 
principal subdiagonals.  The subdiagonal immediately above the main diagonal (the “upper 
principal subdiagonal”) records the frequency of one-class downgrades.  The subdiagonal 
immediately below the main diagonal (the “lower principal subdiagonal”) records the frequency 
of receiving a one-class upgrade.  
Tables 3, 4, and 5 highlight differences in Markov transition matrices observed before 
and after FDICIA became effective in 1992.  The rows of each matrix display the frequency 
distributions for transitions experienced by banks whose previous rating is indicated by the row 
label.  To allow for all possibilities, the columns span not only each rating class, but also three 
absorbing states in which a bank formally ceases to exist
6 and two other states that cover the 
possibility that a second examination did not begin during the horizon in question.  Even though 
the data indicate that many banks with initial ratings of 1 to 4 did not experience the beginning of 
a new examination within a given time interval, the fraction of banks that were not re-examined 
in these classes declines noticeably after FDICIA. 
For banks with more than $250 million in assets (“large banks”), Table 3 displays the 
frequency distribution of one-year ratings transitions observed before and after FDICIA became 
effective in 1992.  Although underlying transition probabilities are bound to vary over time with 
macroeconomic and industry conditions, these observed frequencies can be interpreted as 
estimates of average probabilities within each era.  For completed exams at large banks, the odds 
                                                 
5 If multiple examinations occur within the selected horizon, we record the rating given on the last exam. 
6 Disappearance can occur in either of three ways: a regulatory closure; a voluntary merger into an unconnected 
enterprise; or a “rollup” in which the bank is merged into a holding-company affiliate.    12
of keeping the same rating in successive exams, is shown on the main diagonals.  In both eras, it 
is unusual for a large bank to move up or down more than one class when it is re-examined.  This 
is shown by the unshaded cells in the matrix.  Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Chi-squared tests 
establish that, at better than one percent significance, every row of the pre-FDICIA matrix is 
different from the post-FDICIA matrix
7  
Three differences stand out from the table.  First, the probability of receiving the same 
rating in the subsequent examination becomes significantly higher in the post-FDICIA era.  
Second, in part because the performance of both the economy and the banking industry was 
stronger after FDICIA than it had been before its passage, banks in the first four categories prove 
substantially more likely to be upgraded than in the past, as shown by the lower principal 
subdiagonals.  Nevertheless, the likelihood of receiving a downgrade is more or less the same, as 
shown by the upper principal subdiagonals.  Third, although the percentage of problem banks 
that are closed by the regulators approximately equals that of the pre-FDICIA period, the 
percentage of banks that consent to a voluntary merger is more than twice as high. We 
investigate later whether this effect may have been reinforced by the passage of the Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, which made interstate takeovers easier to solicit after 
1994.  
The increase in the frequency of one-step upgrades and voluntary mergers after FDICIA 
at large banks becomes more pronounced when we extend horizon for the transition matrices to a 
two-year horizon as shown in Table 4.  Furthermore, one-step downgrades become notably less 
                                                 
7 According to the K-S test, for each row, the null hypothesis that the observed transition probabilities in the pre-
FDICIA period were drawn from the same population as those in the post-FDICIA era is rejected at one percent 
significance.  According to the Chi-squared test, for each row, the null hypothesis that the pre-FDICIA transition 
probabilities are drawn from the same population as the post-FDICIA transition probabilities is also rejected at the 
one percent level.   13
frequent after FDICIA.  This may occur because the longer window allows for the completion of 
a large proportion of more challenging exams. 
Similar patterns emerge for small banks using an 18-month observations window as 
shown in Table 5.  In contrast to large banks, the odds of keeping the same rating are higher in 
the post-FDICIA period only for 1- and 2-rated banks.  As in the case for large banks, upgrades 
become notably more common and downgrades become somewhat less frequent for all ratings 
transitions during the post-FDICIA era.  Also, mergers provide a more frequent destination.  
Notably, for small banks over this longer horizon, the percentage of banks in the three lowest-
rated categories that have not been re-examined becomes very small in the post-FDICIA period. 
Because banking problems are negatively correlated with national (and local) economic 
growth and positively correlated with sectoral volatility, variations in growth and volatility may 
exert an important influence on the transition probabilities. During the 1992 to 2005 era, these 
factors were favorable, so that the overall incidence of low-rated institutions declined.  In the 
next section, we show that the increased reliance on quasi-voluntary mergers to resolve problem 
banks remains evident when pre-FDICIA and post-FDICIA data are segregated by proxies for 
the health of the national and local economic environments.  
 
4. Effects of National Economic Conditions on Ratings Transitions 
To disentangle the effects of differences due to national and local economic conditions 
from changes due to increased supervisory discipline after FDICIA, in this section and the next 
we reduce the dimensions of our analysis by consolidating the three absorbing states into a single 
state of “absorption” and eliminating post-period and not-rated observations.  We do this because   14
the resulting the 5 x 5 square transition matrices are less sensitive to horizon length and can be 
analyzed in powerful ways.  
First we examine the transition matrices during recession periods and expansion periods 
at an 18-month interval for all insured institutions as shown in Table 6.  The frequency of 
receiving the same rating is similar in recessions and expansion.  The major differences occur in 
the probability of an upgrade along the lower partial subdiagonal and in the probability of 
absorption.  During recessions, upgrades become less likely and absorptions more likely, but the 
frequency of downgrades rises only slightly.
8 
Next we contrast the transition matrices generated by splitting the pre- and post-FDICIA 
periods between observations that occurred during an expansion and during a recession, as 
shown in Tables 7 and 9.  For both small and large banks, the probability of being upgraded rises 
after FDICIA during expansions and recessions alike.  Although we illustrate only for the 
examination intervals that are most relevant to small and large banks, the same pattern emerges 
at other intervals.  Results from Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicate that, in general, the 
differences in the transition matrices are more statistically significant along the pre- and post-
FDICIA dimension than along the expansion and recession dimension. This is shown in Tables 8 
and 10.  Furthermore, post-FDICIA differences are more strongly significant in expansions than 
in recessions and among higher-rated institutions. This supports the better-incentives hypothesis, 
because in these circumstances bank managers should find it less costly to respond to examiner 
criticisms. 
                                                 
8 We should note that the table categorizes examination activity into business-cycle stage if both the beginning and 
ending examination occur within the same business-cycle stage. Because both recessions occurring during this 
period were only nine months long, much shorter than the length of the expansions, this definition results in an 
imbalance in the size of the subsamples—assigning ten times as many observations to expansions than to recessions.  
To investigate the effects of the imbalance, we also studied results for subsamples based only on whether the initial 
exam took place in a recession or expansion. The results were similar. 
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To examine further the effects of the national economy on the transitions, we look at the 
ratings transitions from a survival analysis perspective.  For each ratings class, Table 11 
compares the mean and standard deviation of the number of months that elapse before a bank 
undergoes a ratings change or absorption before and after FDICIA.  Within all five CAMELS 
classes, both the mean and the standard deviation of the number of months decline substantially.  
The same pattern emerges across ratings classes for small and large banks taken separately.  
The estimated empirical survival function is displayed in Figures 1 and 2.  Treating 
expansion and recession periods separately, each curve plots the estimated probability that an 
institution stays in the same rating class against the number of months it has previously remained 
in that class.  In both stages of the business cycle, the post-FDICIA survival functions begin 
above their pre-FDICIA counterparts and truncate sharply instead of developing a long tail.  
Consistent with the dictates of the Prompt Corrective Action provisions of FDICIA, post-
FDICIA survival functions truncate much earlier in recessions than in expansions.  Irrespective 
of whether we apply a log-rank, Wilcoxon, or log-likelihood ratio (LLR) test, the differences 
between the pre- and post-FDICIA survival functions is significant at one percent. 
Similar differences emerge when we construct survival functions along other dimensions.  
When we compare the survival function for pre-FDICIA to post-FDICIA for each size class, the 
curves differ significantly at one percent by all three tests for each business-cycle stage.  If we 
then consider the survival function for each ratings class separately, differences are less strongly 
significant.  The difference between pre- and post-FDICIA survival functions during expansion 
periods are significantly different at one percent according to the LLR test and at 5 percent or 
better according to the Wilcoxon test.  In contrast, during recession periods, differences are never 
statistically significant for institutions rated CAMELS 1 and 5.  For institutions rated CAMELS   16
2, 3, and 4, differences remain statistically significant at one percent for two of the three tests. 
The failure to find significant differences in the transition probabilities facing a 5-rated 
institution in recession implies that forbearance lives on and helps to explain delays in resolving 
zombie institutions like Indymac and Washington Mutual in 2007-08.  
 
5. Effects of Local Economic Growth on Ratings Transitions 
Conventional wisdom holds that small banks might be more sensitive to local economic 
growth than to national macroeconomic experience.  This leads us to investigate whether and 
how pre-FDICIA and post-FDICIA ratings transitions differ when we control for local economic 
conditions. 
To measure local economic conditions we chose to look at the growth of inflation-
adjusted personal income in an institution’s headquarters state.  We first calculated quarterly 
year-over-year growth rates for real personal income in each state over the 1984 to 2006 period. 
Within each state we partition the growth rates into quartiles.  This variable indicates how strong 
growth in real personal income is in the current quarter is relative to growth over the entire time 
period.  For example, growth in the first quartile (minimum to the 25
th percentile) would be 
representative of relatively weak growth, whereas growth in the fourth quartile (75
th to maximum 
growth) would be relatively strong growth.  Finally, we matched each ratings transition with the 
quartile in which that bank’s home-state growth rate lay in the quarter preceding the transitioning 
exam date. 
When we control for local economic growth in this manner, our results generally hold.  
Tables 12 and 13 compare pre-FDICIA and post-FDICIA transition matrices using a one-year 
horizon for large banks and an 18-month horizon for small ones.  In each quartile with few   17
exceptions, the post-FDICIA era has seen upgrades become more likely, downgrades become 
less likely, and rates of absorption fall.  Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the differences prove 
significant at five percent or better for 19 of 20 corresponding rows in the small-bank sample, 
but for only four rows in the large-bank sample.  Interestingly, three of the significant large-bank 
differences are found in the most adverse situations.  They relate to banks rated 3, 4, and 5 
operating in the lowest growth quartile.  
These results confirm the improved-incentives hypothesis for small banks across the 
board and for the critical class of poorly rated large banks facing difficult local circumstances.  
 
6.  Voluntary Mergers and the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act 
As discussed above, the percentage of banks that consent to a voluntary merger is higher 
in the post-FDICIA period even after controlling for national and local economic conditions.  
One possible explanation for the increase in voluntary mergers is that the passage of the 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) made interstate takeovers easier to 
solicit after 1994.  IBBEA authorizes adequately capitalized and well-managed bank holding 
companies to acquire banks in any state.  Furthermore, the Act allows interstate mergers between 
adequately capitalized and well-managed banks beginning in June 1997. 
To assess the impact of IBBEA, we investigate the extent to which roll-ups within a bank 
holding company and mergers with targets outside the holding company occurred in different 
states during the pre- and post-FDICIA period.  If the IBBEA were driving the increase in the 
voluntary mergers, we would expect that out-of-state mergers would be the major form of 
mergers during the post-1994 period.  Figures 3 and 4 show that in-state roll-ups and mergers 
dominate the number of voluntary mergers in all periods.  Although the number of out-of-state   18
mergers and roll-ups increased, the number of in-state mergers increased even more.  This is 
evidence that the increasing incidence of voluntary mergers is rooted in more than the IBBEA. 
 
7. Differences in Transition Frequencies at Different Supervisory Agencies 
  Tables 14 through 17 investigate whether the transition matrices differ across the 
different regulators.  Although four federal agencies share a responsibility for financial stability, 
their precise missions, supervisory clienteles, and incentive conflicts differ in important respects.  
The Federal Reserve’s prime mission is to stabilize the macroeconomy and watch over the 
purchasing power of the dollar.  Its special clientele consists of large financial holding 
companies and state-chartered member banks.  The FDIC’s mission is to resolve insolvent banks 
and thrifts and to protect the integrity of its deposit-insurance fund.  Its special clientele includes 
nonmember state-chartered banks (“community banks”) and state banking supervisors.  The 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) oversees the safety, soundness, and activities 
of national banks and their operating subsidiaries.  Its special clientele may be described as 
money-center and regional banks.  The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) supervises savings 
and loan associations, federal savings banks, and thrift holding companies.  Realistically, its 
mission includes – and even stresses – the task of enhancing the availability of mortgage credit.  
That significant differences emerge across agencies in the top two ratings classes and in 
the treatment of small institutions generally is shown in Tables 15 and 17.  However, it should be 
noted that the sample contains many more observations for the FDIC than for the Federal 
Reserve, OCC, or OTS.  Non-FDIC observations are unbalanced in time and by cycle stage as 
well.  For example, at the 18-month interval for the Fed, our dataset records only 833 
observations in pre-FDICIA expansions and 266 observations in pre-FDICIA recessions.  The   19
corresponding sample cells for the OCC contain only 587 and 157 observations respectively; 
OTS counts are larger: 1,915 and 791, respectively.  
Table 18 shows that when we control only for business-cycle stage and the enactment of 
FDICIA, differences in the frequency distributions are significant at 5 percent or better for all 10 
rows at the FDIC, and for 8 of the 10 rows at the OCC, but only for 3 out of the 10 rows at both 
the Fed and OTS.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that their more-complex missions 
undercut supervisory incentives at the latter two agencies.  
 
8. Effects on the Sequencing of Rating Transitions 
Our final partition investigates the sequencing of upgrades and downgrades across 
successive examinations.  For banks that receive a completed examination within the indicated 
intervals, Tables 19 and 20 show the conditional probabilities that apply pre-FDICIA and post-
FDICIA to large banks and small banks, respectively. In both tables, post-FDICIA changes in 
probabilities show identical patterns: (1) upgrades become less likely to follow upgrades; (2) 
upgrades become more likely to follow downgrades; and (3) downgrades become less likely to 
follow downgrades.  These changes are statistically significant and further support the better-
incentives hypothesis.  The first pattern may be interpreted as a diminution of possible “halo” 
effects.  The second and third show that banks that suffer downgrades are more promptly curing 
the deficiencies that an exam uncovers than they had in the past.  
 
9. Summary of Policy Implications 
O’Keefe and Dahl (1996) found that increases in examination frequency induced by 
FDICIA made CAMELS ratings more reliable indicators of bank condition.  Data reviewed in   20
this paper show that the character and quality of bank supervision in the United States also 
improved in the years following the enactment of FDICIA.  During business-cycle expansions, 
our data strongly support the better-incentives hypothesis.  Giving supervisors the authority and 
the obligation to wind up troubled banks before their accounting net worth can be exhausted 
helped to make banks respond more promptly to examiner criticism and to lessen the strength of 
go-for-broke incentives at troubled banks.  
In 2007-08, FDICIA protocols have been tested by a deep and long-lasting 
macroeconomic slowdown. It turns out that the timeliness of regulators’ PCA triggers is 
weakened by relying on risk-weighted measures of capital adequacy and by accounting estimates 
of on-balance-sheet net worth rather than broader economic measures of bank capital.  
Nevertheless, during the post-FDICIA era, banks became more concerned with earning a 
favorable CAMELS rating than they had been previously.  As opposed to making endgame 
gambles for resurrection or languishing in a problem state until regulators finally pull the plug, 
much larger proportions of problem banks did successfully rehabilitate themselves and preserved 
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Appendix A 
Types of Examinations Included in Source Data 
The source data covers the period from 1984 to 2005.  The Pre-FDICIA period is defined as 1984 to 1991 and the Post-FDICIA period is 






Number of Examinations 
 
Percent of Examinations 
Examination conducted by:    Pre-FDICIA Post-FDICIA  Total  Pre-FDICIA Post-FDICIA Total 
State  Banking  Authorities 1984–2005  19,278  36,643  55,921 40.28  34.47  36.28 
FDIC 1984–2005  21,276  25,117  46,393  44.46  23.64  30.10 
Federal Reserve or OCC  1984–2005  398  25,843  26,241  0.84  24.32  17.02 
OTS 1989–2005  777  11,079  11,856  1.62  10.42  7.69 
Joint Examinations  1984–2005  2,753  5,253  8,006  5.75  4.94  5.19 
Concurrent Examinations  1984–1992  3,373  2,354  5,727  7.05  2.21  3.72 
Total    47,855 106,289 154,144  100.00  100.00  100.00 




Percentage of Institutions that Did Not Undergo a Complete Re-Examination 
This table provides evidence on the percentage of large and small insured institutions in each composite rating class that did not undergo a complete re-
examination in the three indicated intervals before and after FDICIA.  Small institutions are defined as institutions with less than $250 million in assets.  Large 
institutions are those with at least $250 million in assets.  The pre-FDICIA period is defined as 1984 to 1991.  The post-FDICIA period is defined as 1992 to 
2003. 
Panel A:  Large Institutions 
Pre-FDICIA Period 
Composite Rating  Number of Observations  Within 12 Months  Within 18 Months  Within 24 Months 
1  421 82.19  59.62  43.23 
2  1,398 73.18 50.07 34.98 
3  553 67.81  34.36  22.78 
4  438 62.10  21.69  10.50 
5  318 50.94  16.67 6.29 
Post-FDICIA Period 
Composite Rating  Number of Observations  Within 12 Months  Within 18 Months  Within 24 Months 
1  7,790 65.64  6.63  2.93 
2  9,537 64.28  7.52  3.45 
3  1,153 55.42 10.13  6.54 
4  488 45.49  13.46 7.52 
5  200 32.50  10.00 4.02 
Panel B:  Small Institutions 
Pre-FDICIA Period 
Composite Rating  Number of Observations  Within 12 Months  Within 18 Months  Within 24 Months 
1  8,051 70.91 43.71  27.31 
2  20,659 69.45  42.52 26.55 
3  8,531 50.87 19.68  11.15 
4  5,562 44.77 12.69 6.20 
5  1,675 31.64  8.42 4.24 
Post-FDICIA Period 
Composite Rating  Number of Observations  Within 12 Months  Within 18 Months  Within 24 Months 
1  28,290 78.39  35.98  7.68 
2  47,376 70.01  27.75  6.26 
3  8,547 43.62  7.52  4.68 
4  2,810 34.91  7.14  4.94 
5  657 25.39 6.58 4.81 
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Table 2 
Prompt Corrective Action Categories 
The Prompt Correction Action categories are provided in the FDIC Rules and Regulations.  To be considered well capitalized, an institution must not be 
subject to any formal enforcement action that requires it to meet and maintain a certain capital level.  If the bank has a composite CAMELS rating of 1 in 
the most recent examination and is not experiencing or anticipating significant growth, then the leverage ratio can be as low as 3 percent for both the 
Adequately Capitalized and Undercapitalized categories. 
  Total Risk-Based  
Capital Ratio 




Tangible Equity to  
Total Assets  
Well Capitalized 
 
10 percent or higher and  6 percent or higher and  5 percent or higher   
Adequately Capitalized 
 
10 percent or higher and  4 percent or higher and  4 percent or higher   
Undercapitalized 
 
Less than 8 percent or  Less than 4 percent or  Less than 4 percent
   
Significantly Undercapitalized 
 
Less than 6 percent or  Less than 3 percent or  Less than 3 percent   
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Table 3 
One-Year Transition Matrix for Large Institutions 
This table provides the one-year transition matrix for composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to large FDIC-Insured 
institutions.  The transition probabilities are expressed in percent.  Large institutions are defined as those with at least $250 million in total 
assets.  The Pre-FDICIA period is defined as 1984 to 1991 and the post-FDICIA period is defined as 1992 to 2003.  “Merger” refers to a 
voluntary merger with an institution outside a bank’s holding company.  A roll-up is a merger between two entities within a holding 
company.  “Post-period” refers to the case where the institution was rated within the time horizon but the time horizon did not expire until 




















1  12.59  2.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.71  0.48  82.19 1.66 
2  1.79  16.45  1.65 0.57 0.07 0.00  1.22  0.72  73.18 4.36 
3  0.00  4.88  14.47  2.71 0.72 0.00  1.81  1.08  67.81 6.51 
4  0.00 0.46 2.97  14.38  5.25 0.46  1.37 1.14  62.10  11.87 




















1  24.42  3.52 0.13 0.03 0.00  0.00  2.20  2.13  65.64 1.95 
2  3.62  23.31  1.05 0.20  0.03 0.01  2.67 2.28  64.28 2.56 
3  0.00  18.13  15.96  2.52 0.35  0.00  3.64  1.99 55.42 1.99 
4  0.00 3.48  16.19  23.16  5.12 0.61 3.69 2.05  45.49 0.20 
5  0.00 0.00 1.50  12.50  24.50 24.00  3.50  1.00 32.50  0.50 
. 
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Table 4 
Two-Year Transition Matrix for Large Institutions 
This table provides the two-year transition matrix for composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to large FDIC-Insured 
institutions.  The transition probabilities are expressed in percent.  Large institutions are defined as those with at least $250 million in total 
assets.  The Pre-FDICIA period is defined as 1984 to 1991 and the post-FDICIA period is defined as 1992 to 2003.  “Merger” refers to a 
voluntary merger with an institution outside a bank’s holding company.  A roll-up is a merger between two entities within a holding 
company.  “Post-period” refers to the case where the institution was rated within the time horizon but the time horizon did not expire until 




















1  31.35  12.83 0.24 0.71 0.00  0.00  2.38  0.95 43.23 8.31 
2  4.15  33.33  6.80 3.43 0.43 0.07  3.08  1.29 34.98  12.45 
3  0.18  15.01  25.14  10.31 3.80  0.54  3.44  1.27 22.78 17.54 
4  0.00 2.05  8.68  27.17  14.61 3.88  4.57  2.05 10.50  26.48 




















1  68.35  10.72 0.33  0.01  0.00  0.00  3.77  3.78  2.93 10.10 
2  12.21  61.43  2.64 0.41 0.08 0.02  4.72 4.03 3.45 11.00 
3  0.83  45.99  24.42  5.53 0.37 0.00  5.81 2.86 6.54 7.65 
4  0.63 15.66  31.32  24.01  6.89 1.04 6.68 3.76 7.52 2.51 
5  0.50 2.01  12.56  25.63  21.11 25.13  6.03  1.51  4.02  1.51 
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Table 5 
18-Month Transition Matrix for Small Institutions 
This table provides the 18-month transition matrix for composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to small FDIC-Insured 
institutions.  The transition probabilities are expressed in percent.  Small institutions are defined as those with less than $250 million in 
total assets.  The Pre-FDICIA period is defined as 1984 to 1991 and the post-FDICIA period is defined as 1992 to 2003.  “Merger” refers 
to a voluntary merger with an institution outside a bank’s holding company.  A roll-up is a merger between two entities within a holding 
company.  “Post-period” refers to the case where the institution was rated within the time horizon but the time horizon did not expire until 




















1  35.93  10.53 0.56 0.11 0.00  0.04  1.55  0.68 43.71 6.88 
2  4.45  36.83  4.53 1.06 0.18 0.03  1.80  0.64  42.52 7.95 
3  0.21  24.65  33.90  8.77 0.81 0.23  1.92  0.68  19.68 9.14 
4  0.00 4.17  20.78  38.85  9.30 2.36  2.36 0.47  12.69 9.03 




















1  48.44  9.42 0.30 0.04 0.01  0.00  2.19  1.91  35.98 1.71 
2  8.95  51.95  3.20 0.44  0.06 0.03  2.34 1.72  27.75 3.56 
3  0.63  43.73  33.52  4.75 0.38  0.10  2.99  1.34 7.52  5.03 
4  0.07 13.05  35.23  28.31  5.52 0.61 5.73 1.48  7.14 2.85 
5  0.61 4.59  11.03  21.75  22.97 21.75  6.74  2.14  6.58  1.84 




Transition Matrix for All FDIC-Insured Institutions During Business Cycle Periods 
This table provides the 18-month transition matrix for composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to all FDIC-Insured 
institutions.  The transition probabilities are expressed in percent.  Recessions and expansions are defined by NBER business cycle peaks 
and troughs.  Transitions are counted only for the transitions in which both end-points occur on the same side of an NBER-defined 
business-cycle peak or trough.  Absorption includes failures, mergers within a bank holding company, and mergers with a bank outside 


















1  72.76  16.06 0.53  0.11  0.00  10.54  100.00 2,647 
2  7.14  70.82  8.03 1.87 0.38  11.76  100.00  4,497 
3  0.09  30.07  47.10  9.63 1.53  11.58  100.00  1,174 
4  0.34 3.21 22.17  50.08  10.15 14.04 100.00  591 


















1  77.07  15.36 0.55  0.08  0.01  6.93  100.00  27,637 
2  12.26  74.48  5.54 0.99  0.15  6.58  100.00  49,381 
3  0.45  43.48  41.70  8.39 0.87  5.21  100.00  13,571 
4  0.04 8.21  31.46  42.42  9.81 8.06 100.00  6,994 
5  0.14 1.91 6.34  17.77  31.25 42.58  100.00  2,144 
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Table 7 
Transition Matrix for Small Institutions During Business Cycle Periods 
This table provides the 18-month transition matrix for composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to small FDIC-Insured 
institutions.  The transition probabilities are expressed in percent.  Small institutions are defined as those with less than $250 million in total 
assets.  The Pre-FDICIA period is defined as 1984 to 1991 and the post-FDICIA period is defined as 1992 to 2003.  Recession and 
expansion periods are defined by NBER business-cycle peaks and troughs.  Absorption includes failures, mergers within a bank holding 
company, and mergers with a bank outside the holding company 
Pre-FDICIA Expansion Period 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  72.44  21.86 1.27 0.25 0.04  4.15  100.00 
2  10.30  73.39  9.12 2.21 0.38  4.60  100.00 
3  0.36  34.70  48.03  11.90 1.06  3.95  100.00 
4  0.00 5.30  26.60  50.59  11.09 6.43  100.00 
5  0.00 1.18 3.74  15.39  36.32 43.36  100.00 
Post-FDICIA Expansion Period 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  77.69  15.45 0.49 0.07 0.02  6.28  100.00 
2  12.84  75.83  4.82 0.68 0.09  5.74  100.00 
3  0.71  49.76  38.65  5.38 0.44  5.05  100.00 
4  0.08 14.71 38.99  31.44  6.04 8.74  100.00 
5  0.67 5.18  12.02  23.71  25.04 33.39  100.00 
Pre-FDICIA Recession Period 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  69.49  23.19 1.63 0.31 0.08  5.29  100.00 
2  9.44  70.01  11.00 3.24 0.69  5.62  100.00 
3  0.20  29.41  53.36  10.98 0.60  5.46  100.00 
4  0.10 4.03  25.78  54.18  9.67 6.24  100.00 
5  0.00 1.32 1.85  15.61  38.36 42.86  100.00 
Post-FDICIA Recession Period 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  77.83  17.42 0.51 0.09 0.03  4.12  100.00 
2  8.92  79.20  6.93 0.92 0.06  3.97  100.00 
3  0.00  38.82  46.11  9.17 0.88  5.03  100.00 
4  0.65 6.54  39.87  35.29  6.54 11.11  100.00 
5  0.00 0.00  11.11  44.44  27.78 16.67  100.00 




Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Results 
Transition Matrix for Small Institutions During Business Cycle Periods 
This table provides the results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests applied to the 18-month transition matrix for the 
composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to small FDIC-Insurred Institutions.  Small institutions are those 
with less than $250 million in total assets.  The Pre-FDICIA period is defined as 1984 to 1991 and the post-FDICIA period 
as 1992 to 2003.  Recession and expansion periods are determined by the NBER business-cycle peaks and troughs.  The 
null hypothesis for the K-S test is that the row probabilities for the two groups are drawn from the same distribution.  
*=Can reject the null hypothesis at the 90% confidence level, **=95%, ***=99% 
Pre-FDICIA Expansion vs. Post-FDICIA Expansion    Pre-FDICIA Recession vs. Post-FDICIA Recession 
1  ***   1  *** 
2  ***   2  *** 
3  ***   3  *** 
4  ***   4  *** 
5  ***   5  ** 
Pre-FDICIA Expansion vs. Pre-FDICIA Recession    Post-FDICIA Expansion vs. Post-FDICIA Recession 
1    1  
2  ***  2  *** 
3  ***  3  *** 
4    4  
5    5  
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Table 9 
Transition Matrix for Large Institutions During Business Cycle Periods 
This table provides the one-year transition matrix for composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to large FDIC-Insured institutions.  The 
transition probabilities are expressed in percent.  Large institutions are defined as those with at least $250 million in total assets.  The Pre-FDICIA period 
is defined as 1984 to 1991 and the post-FDICIA period is defined as 1992 to 2003.  Recession and expansion periods are defined by NBER business-
cycle peaks and troughs.  Absorption includes failures, mergers within a bank holding company, and mergers with a bank outside the holding company 
Pre-FDICIA Expansion Period 
 1  2  3  4  5  Absorption  Total 
1  61.54  22.22 2.56  0.85  0.00  12.82  100.00 
2  7.60  67.30  10.84 5.13  0.95  8.17  100.00 
3  0.00  20.82  51.02  15.10 4.90  8.16  100.00 
4  0.00 2.41  18.47  51.00  18.47 9.64  100.00 
5  0.00 0.49  2.93  11.22  29.27 56.10  100.00 
Post-FDICIA Expansion Period 
 1  2  3  4  5  Absorption  Total 
1  76.20  11.59 0.39  0.07  0.00  11.75  100.00 
2  10.31  72.53  3.35 0.58  0.08  13.16  100.00 
3  0.00  42.27  37.80  6.52 0.74  12.66  100.00 
4  0.00 6.14  30.32  42.24  9.75 11.55  100.00 
5  0.00 0.00  2.21  19.12  36.76 41.91  100.00 
Pre-FDICIA Recession Period 
 1  2  3  4  5  Absorption  Total 
1  40.74  25.93 0.00  7.41  0.00  25.93  100.00 
2  3.42  55.48  23.97 10.27  0.68  6.16  100.00 
3  0.00  16.87  32.53  25.30 15.66  9.64  100.00 
4  0.00 1.05  9.47  52.63  26.32 10.53  100.00 
5  0.00 1.10  3.30  5.49  26.37 63.74  100.00 
Post-FDICIA Recession Period 
 1  2  3  4  5  Absorption  Total 
1  80.81  13.41 0.22  0.00  0.00  5.56  100.00 
2  7.79  81.02  3.90 0.50  0.10  6.69  100.00 
3  0.00  41.18  40.00  8.24 2.35  8.24  100.00 
4  0.00 5.56  16.67  33.33  27.78 16.67  100.00 
5  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 100.00 100.00   32
Table 10 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Results 
Transition Matrix for Large Institutions During Business Cycle Periods 
This table provides the results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests applied to the one-year transition matrix for the 
composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to large FDIC-Insured Institutions.  Large institutions are those 
with at least $250 million in total assets.  The Pre-FDICIA period is defined as 1984 to 1991 and the post-FDICIA period 
as 1992 to 2003.  Recession and expansion periods are determined by the NBER business-cycle peaks and troughs.  The 
null hypothesis for the K-S test is that the row probabilities for the two groups are drawn from the same distribution.  
*=Can reject the null hypothesis at the 90% confidence level, **=95%, ***=99% 
Pre-FDICIA Expansion vs. Post-FDICIA Expansion    Pre-FDICIA Recession vs. Post-FDICIA Recession 
1  **   1  *** 
2  ***   2  *** 
3  ***   3  *** 
4  ***   4   
5  *   5   
Pre-FDICIA Expansion vs. Pre-FDICIA Recession    Post-FDICIA Expansion vs. Post-FDICIA Recession 
1     1  *** 
2  ***   2  *** 
3  ***   3   
4     4   
5     5   
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Table 11 
Number of Months until FDIC-Insured Banks Undergo a Change in State 
This table provides the number of until FDIC-Insured Banks undergo a change in state which is defined as either a ratings change or absorption.  
Absorption includes failures, mergers within a bank holding company, and mergers with a bank outside the holding company.  The results are 
presented by CAMELS rating class.  The Pre-FDICIA Period is defined as 1984 to 1991 and the post-FDICIA period is defined as 1992 to 2003. 





















Mean  75.40 
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Table 12 
Transition Matrix for Large Institutions by Local Economic Conditions 
This table provides the one-year transition matrix for composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to large FDIC-Insured institutions.  The transition 
probabilities are expressed in percent.  Large institutions are defined as those with at least $250 million in total assets.  The Pre-FDICIA period is defined as 1984 
to 1991 and the post-FDICIA period is defined as 1992 to 2003.  State income growth is the quarterly year-over-year growth in inflation adjusted personal 
income in the state in which in the institution is headquartered.  The growth rates are calculated over the 1984 to 2006 period and partitioned into quartiles.  The 
first quartile of state personal income growth, representing the weakest growth, is the minimum to the 25
th percentile, the second quartile is the 25
th to the 50
th, 
the third quartile is the 50
th to the 75
th percentile and the fourth quartile is the 75
th to the maximum, representing the strongest growth. 
Pre-FDICIA, First Quartile State Income Growth 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  69.23  15.38 0.00 0.00 0.00  15.38  100.00 
2  6.06  68.18  12.12 6.06 1.52 6.06  100.00 
3  0.00  12.77  57.45  14.89 4.26  10.64  100.00 
4  0.00 0.00 1.79  51.79  30.36 16.07  100.00 
5  0.00 0.00 0.00 3.33  15.00 81.67  100.00 
Post-FDICIA, First Quartile State Income Growth 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  81.21  10.69 0.72 0.14 0.00 7.23  100.00 
2  10.78  74.57  3.36 0.61 0.20  10.48  100.00 
3  0.00  39.58  43.75  6.77 0.00 9.90  100.00 
4  0.00 6.42  31.19  40.37  12.84 9.17  100.00 
5  0.00 0.00 4.35  15.22  43.48 36.96  100.00 
Pre-FDICIA, Second Quartile State Income Growth 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  78.57  14.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.14  100.00 
2  5.56  74.07  7.41 3.70 0.00 9.26  100.00 
3  0.00  3.45  58.62  13.79 6.90  17.24  100.00 
4  0.00 0.00  14.29  61.90  14.29 9.52  100.00 
5  0.00 0.00 2.94  11.76  17.65 67.65  100.00 
Post-FDICIA, Second Quartile State Income Growth 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  76.46  11.33 0.53 0.18 0.00  11.50  100.00 
2  10.13  69.23  4.10 1.15 0.13  15.26  100.00 
3  0.00  46.53  31.94  6.94 1.39  13.19  100.00 
4  0.00 3.80  29.11  48.10  8.86 10.13  100.00 
5  0.00 0.00 2.13  14.89  36.17 46.81  100.00 
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Table 12 (continued) 
Transition Matrix for Large Institutions by Local Economic Conditions 
This table provides the one-year transition matrix for composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to large FDIC-Insured institutions.  The transition 
probabilities are expressed in percent.  Large institutions are defined as those with at least $250 million in total assets.  The Pre-FDICIA period is defined as 1984 
to 1991 and the post-FDICIA period is defined as 1992 to 2003.  State income growth is the quarterly year-over-year growth in inflation adjusted personal 
income in the state in which in the institution is headquartered.  The growth rates are calculated over the 1984 to 2006 period and partitioned into quartiles.  The 
first quartile of state personal income growth, representing the weakest growth, is the minimum to the 25
th percentile, the second quartile is the 25
th to the 50
th, 
the third quartile is the 50
th to the 75
th percentile and the fourth quartile is the 75
th to the maximum, representing the strongest growth. 
Pre-FDICIA, Third Quartile State Income Growth 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  85.00  10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00  100.00 
2  7.50  77.50  5.00 0.83 0.00 9.17  100.00 
3  0.00  33.33  52.78  2.78 0.00  11.11  100.00 
4  0.00 3.85  19.23  57.69  11.54 7.69  100.00 
5  0.00 0.00 6.25 6.25  37.50 50.00  100.00 
Post-FDICIA, Third Quartile State Income Growth 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  73.49  10.74 0.17 0.00 0.00  15.60  100.00 
2  13.04  66.91  2.15 0.57 0.00  17.34  100.00 
3  0.00  43.16  34.74  3.16 2.11  16.84  100.00 
4  0.00 5.41  29.73  48.65  2.70 13.51  100.00 
5  0.00 0.00 0.00  25.81  32.26 41.94  100.00 
Pre-FDICIA, Fourth Quartile State Income Growth 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  76.19  19.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.76  100.00 
2  12.16  70.27  6.76 1.35 0.00 9.46  100.00 
3  0.00  27.59  55.17  10.34 0.00 6.90  100.00 
4  0.00 10.00 40.00  50.00  0.00 0.00  100.00 
5  0.00 0.00 7.14  14.29  57.14 21.43  100.00 
Post-FDICIA, Fourth Quartile State Income Growth 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  69.91  10.63 0.15 0.00 0.00  19.31  100.00 
2  9.94  68.57  2.92 0.00 0.00  18.57  100.00 
3  0.00  42.11  35.09  5.26 0.00  17.54  100.00 
4  0.00 13.89 25.00  33.33  8.33 19.44  100.00 
5  0.00 0.00 0.00  30.00  20.00 50.00  100.00 
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Table 13 
Transition Matrix for Small Institutions by Local Economic Conditions 
This table provides the 18-month transition matrix for composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to small FDIC-Insured institutions.  The transition 
probabilities are expressed in percent.  Small institutions are defined as those with less than $250 million in total assets.  The Pre-FDICIA period is defined as 
1984 to 1991 and the post-FDICIA period is defined as 1992 to 2003.  State income growth is the quarterly year-over-year growth in inflation adjusted personal 
income in the state in which in the institution is headquartered.  The growth rates are calculated over the 1984 to 2006 period and partitioned into quartiles.  The 
first quartile of state personal income growth, representing the weakest growth, is the minimum to the 25
th percentile, the second quartile is the 25
th to the 50
th, 
the third quartile is the 50
th to the 75
th percentile and the fourth quartile is the 75
th to the maximum, representing the strongest growth. 
Pre-FDICIA, First Quartile State Income Growth 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  72.13  22.86 1.05 0.24 0.00 3.72  100.00 
2  9.26  73.31  10.23 2.91 0.59 3.70  100.00 
3  0.14  30.20  50.67  14.31 1.10 3.58  100.00 
4  0.00 4.68  24.27  50.85  13.26 6.93  100.00 
5  0.00 0.54 1.79  13.77  35.78 48.12  100.00 
Post-FDICIA, First Quartile State Income Growth 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  78.02  16.41 0.61 0.09 0.06 4.80  100.00 
2  11.50  76.92  5.93 0.86 0.16 4.64  100.00 
3  0.28  45.29  42.55  7.53 0.45 3.90  100.00 
4  0.15 9.40  36.52  36.83  8.78 8.32  100.00 
5  0.55 3.28 8.20  21.86  24.59 41.53  100.00 
Pre-FDICIA, Second Quartile State Income Growth 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  73.52  21.18 1.48 0.31 0.00 3.50  100.00 
2  9.05  75.03  9.45 2.03 0.30 4.13  100.00 
3  0.42  36.47  46.25  11.58 1.32 3.96  100.00 
4  0.00 5.47  27.86  48.65  11.78 6.24  100.00 
5  0.00 0.92 5.07  14.29  35.94 43.78  100.00 
Post-FDICIA, Second Quartile State Income Growth 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  78.18  14.71 0.48 0.00 0.00 6.64  100.00 
2  12.76  75.84  4.79 0.74 0.03 5.84  100.00 
3  0.73  51.07  35.70  6.06 0.52 5.91  100.00 
4  0.00 16.37 37.83  31.09  5.50 9.22  100.00 
5  0.54 4.86  13.51  24.32  30.81 25.95  100.00 
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Table 13 (continued) 
Transition Matrix for Small Institutions by Local Economic Conditions 
This table provides the 18-month transition matrix for composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to small FDIC-Insured institutions.  The transition 
probabilities are expressed in percent.  Large institutions are defined as those with less than $250 million in total assets.  The Pre-FDICIA period is defined as 
1984 to 1991 and the post-FDICIA period is defined as 1992 to 2003.  State income growth is the quarterly year-over-year growth in inflation adjusted personal 
income in the state in which in the institution is headquartered.  The growth rates are calculated over the 1984 to 2006 period and partitioned into quartiles.  The 
first quartile of state personal income growth, representing the weakest growth, is the minimum to the 25
th percentile, the second quartile is the 25
th to the 50
th, 
the third quartile is the 50
th to the 75
th percentile and the fourth quartile is the 75
th to the maximum, representing the strongest growth. 
Pre-FDICIA, Third Quartile State Income Growth 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  74.80  19.36 0.92 0.10 0.00 4.82  100.00 
2  8.82  75.18  8.14 1.27 0.16 6.43  100.00 
3  0.20  39.95  44.44  10.22 0.95 4.23  100.00 
4  0.00 6.33  30.03  49.71  8.63 5.29  100.00 
5  0.00 1.28 5.98  15.81  35.47 41.45  100.00 
Post-FDICIA, Third Quartile State Income Growth 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  77.99  14.84 0.33 0.00 0.02 6.82  100.00 
2  14.19  74.25  4.19 0.43 0.10 6.84  100.00 
3  0.81  52.79  36.86  3.95 0.29 5.29  100.00 
4  0.18 14.08 38.57  32.36  5.48 9.32  100.00 
5  1.74 7.83  11.30  26.09  20.00 33.04  100.00 
Pre-FDICIA, Fourth Quartile State Income Growth 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  67.85  21.71 0.84 0.21 0.00 9.39  100.00 
2  8.47  74.06  7.59 2.14 0.29 7.44  100.00 
3  0.66  31.80  48.93  12.52 1.15 4.94  100.00 
4  0.00 5.44  24.09  46.89  13.73 9.84  100.00 
5  0.00 1.45 3.62  13.04  36.23 45.65  100.00 
Post-FDICIA, Fourth Quartile State Income Growth 
  1 2 3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  77.16  14.88 0.56 0.11 0.02 7.28  100.00 
2  13.32  75.78  4.04 0.59 0.06 6.20  100.00 
3  1.08  51.29  38.16  3.93 0.48 5.06  100.00 
4  0.00 18.94 45.17  24.04  4.37 7.47  100.00 
5  0.00 5.36  16.07  23.21  22.32 33.04  100.00 
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Table 14 
Transition Matrix for Large Institutions by Primary Federal Regulator 
This table provides the one-year transition matrix for composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to large FDIC-Insured 
institutions by primary federal regulator.  The transition probabilities are expressed in percent.  Large institutions are defined as those 
with at least $250 million in total assets.  Absorption includes failures, mergers within a bank holding company, and mergers with a bank 
outside the holding company. 
FDIC 
  1  2 3  4 5  Absorption Total 
1  79.16  9.93 0.08  0.00 0.00  10.84  100.00 
2  12.25  73.00  3.08 0.90  0.06  10.71  100.00 
3  0.00  38.93  42.14  6.79 2.14  10.00  100.00 
4  0.00 5.52  22.07  48.28  16.55 7.59  100.00 
5  0.00 0.00  3.53  12.94  34.12 49.41  100.00 
Federal Reserve 
  1  2 3  4 5  Absorption Total 
1  70.53  12.09 1.01  0.00 0.00  16.37  100.00 
2  10.60  71.57  4.58 0.48  0.00  12.77  100.00 
3  0.00  41.77  45.57  1.27 0.00  11.39  100.00 
4  0.00 0.00  30.00  60.00  5.00 5.00  100.00 
5  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  75.00 25.00  100.00 
OCC 
  1  2 3  4 5  Absorption Total 
1  77.05  11.77 0.30  0.00 0.00  10.88  100.00 
2  9.34  74.38  1.97 0.21  0.10  14.00  100.00 
3  0.00  42.37  37.29  11.86 3.39  5.08  100.00 
4  0.00 15.79  10.53  31.58  15.79 26.32  100.00 
5  0.00 0.00  0.00  6.67  13.33 80.00  100.00 
OTS 
  1  2 3  4 5  Absorption Total 
1  52.55  8.03 0.00  0.00 0.00  39.42  100.00 
2  8.06  51.64  2.99 0.30  0.00  37.01  100.00 
3  0.00  30.37  42.96  5.19 0.00  21.48  100.00 
4  0.00 0.79  26.98  51.59  9.52 11.11  100.00 
5  0.00 0.00  1.94  15.53  24.27 58.25  100.00   39
Table 15 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Results 
Transition Matrix for Large Institutions by Primary Federal Regulator 
This table provides the results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests applied to the one-year transition matrix for the 
composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to large FDIC-Insured Institutions by primary federal regulator.  
Large institutions are those with at least $250 million in total assets.  The null hypothesis for the K-S test is that the row 
probabilities for the two groups are drawn from the same distribution.  *=Can reject the null hypothesis at the 90% 
confidence level, **=95%, ***=99% 
FDIC vs. Federal Reserve    OCC vs. FDIC 
1  **  1  (None significant) 
2     2   
3     3   
4     4   
5     5   
OCC vs. Federal Reserve    OCC vs. OTS 
1  (None significant)    1  *** 
2     2  *** 
3     3   
4     4   
5     5   
OTS vs. Federal Reserve    OTS vs. FDIC 
1  ***   1  *** 
2  ***   2  *** 
3     3   
4     4   
5        5   
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Table 16 
Transition Matrix for Small Institutions by Primary Federal Regulator 
This table provides the 18-month transition matrix for composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to 
small FDIC-Insured institutions by primary federal regulator.  The transition probabilities are expressed in percent.  
Small institutions are defined as those with less than $250 million in total assets.  Absorption includes failures, 
mergers within a bank holding company, and mergers with a bank outside the holding company 
FDIC 
  1  2  3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  77.99  16.21  0.53 0.08 0.01  5.19  100.00 
2  12.17  75.89  5.98 1.05 0.16  4.76  100.00 
3  0.38  43.03  43.17  9.19 0.80  3.42  100.00 
4  0.02 7.52  31.65  45.03  10.12 5.66  100.00 
5  0.15 2.25  5.77  18.28  35.21 38.35  100.00 
Federal Reserve 
  1  2  3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  73.93  16.77  0.61 0.12 0.06  8.51  100.00 
2  11.68  76.19  5.10 0.51 0.10  6.42  100.00 
3  0.36  42.53  42.35  7.83 0.71  6.23  100.00 
4  0.00 4.23  31.69  42.25  12.32 9.51  100.00 
5  0.00 0.89  8.93  10.71  33.04 46.43  100.00 
OCC 
  1  2  3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  74.93  13.61  0.79 0.05 0.00  10.61  100.00 
2  8.21  77.90  4.74 0.74 0.06  8.36  100.00 
3  0.21  40.81  44.15  6.16 0.94  7.72  100.00 
4  0.00 8.47  32.88  30.51  7.80 20.34  100.00 
5  0.00 0.00  7.14  11.90  27.78 53.17  100.00 
OTS 
  1  2  3 4 5  Absorption  Total 
1  72.96  14.78  0.26 0.00 0.00  12.01  100.00 
2  12.41  73.53  5.44 0.58 0.08  7.97  100.00 
3  0.19  41.12  44.98  6.27 0.10  7.34  100.00 
4  0.17 10.45  32.93  40.94  6.62 8.89  100.00 
5  0.29 0.88  5.56  17.25  30.12 45.91  100.00 
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Table 17 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Results 
Transition Matrix for Small Institutions by Primary Federal Regulator 
This table provides the results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests applied to the 18-month transition 
matrix for the composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to small FDIC-Insured Institutions 
by primary federal regulator.  Small institutions are those with at less than $250 million in total assets.  
The null hypothesis for the K-S test is that the row probabilities for the two groups are drawn from the 
same distribution.  *=Can reject the null hypothesis at the 90% confidence level, **=95%, ***=99% 
FDIC vs. Federal Reserve    OCC vs. FDIC 
1  **   1  *** 
2     2  *** 
3     3  * 
4     4  *** 
5     5  ** 
OCC vs. Federal Reserve    OCC vs. OTS 
1     1   
2  **   2  *** 
3     3   
4  *   4  *** 
5     5   
OTS vs. Federal Reserve    OTS vs. FDIC 
1  (None significant)    1  *** 
2     2  ** 
3     3   
4     4   
5        5   * 
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Table 18 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Results 
Transition Matrix for Small Institutions by Primary Federal Regulator, FDICIA and Business Cycle Periods 
This table provides the results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests applied to the 18-month transition matrix for the composite examination ratings 
assigned in 1984 to 2003 to small FDIC-Insured Institutions by primary federal regulator, FDICIA periods and business cycle periods.  Small institutions 
are those with at less than $250 million in total assets.  The pre-FDICIA period is defined as 1984 to 1991.  The post-FDICIA period is defined as 1992 
to 2003.  The business cycle periods are defined by the NBER business-cycle peaks and troughs.  The null hypothesis for the K-S test is that the row 
probabilities for the two groups are drawn from the same distribution.  *=Can reject the null hypothesis at the 90% confidence level, **=95%, ***=99% 
FDIC Federal  Reserve 
Pre-FDICIA Expansion vs. Post-FDICIA Expansion  Pre-FDICIA Expansion vs. Post-FDICIA Expansion 
1  ***  1  
2  ***  2 *** 
3  ***  3 *** 
4  ***  4 *** 
5  ***  5  
Pre-FDICIA Recession vs. Post-FDICIA Recession  Pre-FDICIA Recession vs. Post-FDICIA Recession 
1   ***  1  (None significant) 
2  ***  2  
3  ***  3  
4  ***  4  
5  **  5  
OCC OTS 
Pre-FDICIA Expansion vs. Post-FDICIA Expansion  Pre-FDICIA Expansion vs. Post-FDICIA Expansion 
1  ***  1   
2  ***  2  * 
3  ***  3  *** 
4  ***  4  *** 
5  ***  5  *** 
Pre-FDICIA Recession vs. Post-FDICIA Recession  Pre-FDICIA Recession vs. Post-FDICIA Recession 
1  ***  1  (None significant) 
2  ***  2  
3  ***  3  
4    4  
5    5  
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Table 19 
Transition Matrix for Large Institutions 
This table provides the one-year transition matrix for composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to 
large FDIC-Insured institutions.  The transition probabilities are expressed in percent.  Large institutions are defined 
as those with at least $250 million in total assets.  The Pre-FDICIA period is defined as 1984 to 1991 and the post-
FDICIA period is defined as 1992 to 2003. 
Pre-FDICIA 
  Upgrade  Stay the Same  Downgrade  Sample Size 
Upgrade  20.00 65.00 15.00  20 
Stay the Same  13.82 74.80 11.38  123 
Downgrade  5.88 70.59  23.53  17 
Post-FDICIA 
  Upgrade  Stay the Same  Downgrade  Sample Size 
Upgrade  9.95 77.73  12.32 211 
Stay the Same  11.25  82.56 6.19 1,244 
Downgrade  36.96 57.97  5.07  138 
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Table 20 
Transition Matrix for Small Institutions 
This table provides the one-year transition matrix for composite examination ratings assigned in 1984 to 2003 to 
small FDIC-Insured institutions.  The transition probabilities are expressed in percent.  Small institutions are defined 
as those with less than $250 million in total assets.  The Pre-FDICIA period is defined as 1984 to 1991 and the post-
FDICIA period is defined as 1992 to 2003. 
Pre-FDICIA 
  Upgrade  Stay the Same  Downgrade  Sample Size 
Upgrade  17.81 68.02 14.18 2,617 
Stay the Same  18.92 69.99 11.09 9,408 
Downgrade  35.29 53.82 10.90 2,083 
Post-FDICIA 
  Upgrade  Stay the Same  Downgrade  Sample Size 
Upgrade  11.60 72.99 15.41 6,413 
Stay the Same  12.63 79.76  7.61 27,246 
Downgrade  43.23  51.33 5.44 3,620 
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